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Abstract: Suppose theDCFRwould be chosen as an optional instrument, will it make business
easier? It will not, because of its various references to national law, both of a private and
public law nature. It turns out a perilous undertaking to offer private parties a set of rules, by
way of an optional instrument, because it is created quite apart from the national private-law
and public-law context and it covers only part of the private-law legal relationship. In every
single case such a set of rules must be embedded in the applicable national private and public
law. An alternative is explored. A European Self regulatory consultation system could provide
a framework for draftingmodel contracts that are tailored to individual sectors. Thesemodels
should offer terms and conditions that are considered acceptable throughout Europe, with
alternatives for Member States having wider or narrower margins.
Résumé: Est-ce que le commerce serait rendu plus facile si le projet de CCR était choisi comme
un instrument optionnel? Il est probable que non, en raison des nombreuses références au
droit national, à la fois en droit privé et en droit public. C’est dès lors une promesse périlleuse
que d’offrir à des parties privées un ensemble de règles par le biais d’un instrument optionnel,
car celui-ci est créé de façon assez séparée des droits privés et publics nationaux, et il couvre
seulement une partie des relations juridiques de droit privé. Dans chaque cas particulier, un tel
ensemble de règles doit être inséré dans les droits nationaux public et privé applicables. Une
autre option est explorée. Un système européen de consultation auto-régulateur pourrait
fournir un cadre pour élaborer des modèles de contrats qui soient adaptés aux secteurs par-
ticuliers. Ces modèles pourraient offrir des clauses et des conditions considérées comme accept-
ables à travers toute l’Europe avec des options alternatives pour les États membres ayant des
marges plus grandes ou plus étroites.
Zusammenfassung: Würde der DCFR als optionales Instrument gewählt, so stellt sich die
Frage, ob dies denGeschäftsverkehr erleichtern würde. Die Antwort ist negativ, schonwegen
der vielfachen Bezugnahme auf nationales Recht, privates oder auch öffentliches. Es ist ein
problembehaftetes Unternehmen, Privatrechtssubjekten ein Regelwerk als optionales Intru-
ment zur Verfügung zu stellen, dass unabhängig vom nationalen Kontext im Privatrecht und
öffentlichen Recht ist und das nur einen Teil der Privatrechtsbeziehungen wirklich regelt.
Solch ein Regelwerk muss dann in jedem Einzelfall in den nationalen Kontext des privaten
und des öffentlichen Rechts eingebettet werden. Der Beitrag untersucht eine Alternative. Ein
europäisches selbstregulatorisches Konsultationssystem könnte den Rahmen bilden, inner-
halb dessen Modellvertragsbedingungen entwickelt werden, die auf spezifische Sektoren
zugeschnitten sind. DieseModellvertragsbedingungenmüssten natürlich als für ganz Europa
akzeptabel ausgestaltet werden und zudem innerhalb eines weiter oder enger gesteckten
Spielraums auch Alternativen seitens der Mitgliedstaaten zulassen.
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1 One European law of contracts as a perspective for wine merchants
and students
Suppose you are a wine merchant. The wine trade is largely regulated at the
European level. For example, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007 of 22
October 2007 on the organisation of agricultural markets contains, among
many other things, rules for allowing oenological practices and limita-
tions.1These rules have been established in connection with issues like the risk
of consumers being misled because of their established expectations and ideas,
and it is the purpose of the rules to exclude the risk by furthering information
measures. But wine merchants must also have regard to national legislation.
Not only may Member States adopt stricter rules on oenological practices.2
But also the legal relationship between a wine merchant and his customers is
governed by national contract law, designated in their choice of law agreement
or by private international law.
Long before these rules were introduced and long before all these different
European national jurisdictions had come into being, jurists already wrote
about what we may expect of a wine merchant. In the thirteenth century the
French jurist Jacques de Revigny wrote in his commentary on the Codex
Iustinianus about peasants who sold wine to students.3 These peasants knew
quite well that the nature of their wine did not permit keeping it beyond
Christmas, that after Christmas the wine would not be worth the water it
contained. A student who had bought such wine from such a peasant and to
whom this fact had not been pointed out, ought not to suffer as a result. The
winegrower should have pointed out this characteristic of thewine to him. The
text can serve as an illustration of a development which started with the literal
interpretation of Roman texts – what does it say – and which eventually led to
explaining the differences between different texts and recognizing rules that
1 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007 (Single CMO Regulation), OJEC L 299 of
16. 11. 2007, 1.
2 Art. 120d (Stricter rules decided by Member States): Member States may limit or exclude
the use of certain oenological practices and provide for more stringent restrictions for
wines authorised under Community law produced in their territory with a view to re-
inforcing the preservation of the essential characteristics of wines with a protected des-
ignation of origin or a protected geographical indication and of sparkling wines and
liqueur wines. Member States shall communicate those limitations, exclusions and restric-
tions to the Commission, which shall bring them to the attention of the other Member
States. For the Netherlands, see the Regulation of 10 June 2009 of the Commodity Board
for Arable Farming containing rules for the preparation, packing and labelling of wine
(HPAwine Regulation 2009), based on art 2 of the Regulations governing the joint admin-
istration of the Common Agricultural Policy, General Part, art 96 and 98 of the Industrial
Organisation Act and art 16(3) of the Decree establishing commodity boards for arable
farming.
3 K. Bezemer, What Jacques saw (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) 121.
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formed a connection, as itwere, between all these cases.4 TheCodex Iustinianus
and the Digests already said in abstract terms that a buyer should not suffer
from any fraud on the part of the seller; Revigny provided new arguments and
texts for this kind of case, so that we get a picture of the scope of the rule.
It was easy for Revigny, in those days. If local rules did not lead to a solution,
then the ius commune would often provide help and certainly in cases of
purchase and sale it very often did. The advent of new technologies may have
facilitated international trade between wine growers and students, but these
same technologies facilitated the emergence of nation states and, consequently,
national legal systems. And it is precisely these national legal systems which
may impede the international ambitions of our wine merchant and students.
One European private law seems an attractive perspective for wine merchants
who no longer wish to limit their activities to their own regional market and
for students who use the international opportunities offered by e-commerce.
2 An optional instrument
A group of present-day Revignys, commissioned by the European Commis-
sion, have done an impressive job by distilling one single set of principles,
definitions and rules, the Draft Common Frame of Reference, from twenty-
seven systems of private law, doing sowithin six years. The result covers major
fields of private law – not only contract law but also liability law and even parts
of property law. This broad approach was chosen because contract law, so it
was reasoned, is not a self-standing area of law, it cannot be considered apart
from liability law and property law.
How to progress from here? In the green paper on policy options for progress
towards aEuropeanContract Law for consumers andbusinesses (COM(2010)
348) theEuropeanCommissionoutlines all sortsofpolicyoptions forprogress-
ing towards a European private law. One of them is the so-called optional
instrument, a setofuniversal, elementaryprivate lawrules,whichpartieshaving
international ambitions shouldbeable tomake their choiceof law.So that awine
merchantwill soonbeable to say,both tohis suppliers and tohis customers:here
is mywine, offered for sale under the European rules of private law. The Com-
mission has now ordered preparations for the introduction of such an instru-
ment, which according to reports will be limited to 150 contract law rules.
The question is whether any optional instrument could live up to expectations.
I would like to answer this question bearing in mind our wine merchant and
4 K. Bezemer, ‘The infrastructure of the Early Ius Commune: The Formation of Regulae, or
its Failure’, in J.W. Cairns and P.J. du Plessis (ed),TheCreation of the Ius Commune, From
Casus to Regula (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 62.
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students, the same people to whom European Commissioner of Justice Viv-
iane Reding referred when she expressed her expectations:
‘I want a Polish, German or Spanish consumer to feel as safe when doing business with an Italian,
Finnish or French company online as when they are at home. And I want Europe’s small and
medium-sized companies to offer their products and services to consumers in other countries
without having to become experts in the national contract law systems of all other 26 EU coun-
tries.’5
The green paper slightly tempers expectations. Apparently, it is not to be an
instrument that makes knowledge of the laws of the (other) Member States
superfluous, but an instrument which is to stand on its own, as far as possible,
and which must at the same time operate within a national legal system. Of
course this does not mean that the wine merchant must be an expert in the
twenty-seven national systems of private law of Europe, but evenwhen choos-
ing the 150 rules of the optional instrument he will still have to take account of
those twenty-seven systems. But how can an optional instrument then make
things easier for the parties, and not more complicated? Might the Draft
Common Frame of Reference, for example, make an effective contribution
to our trading?
In order to answer this question I will examine whether, and to what extent,
the DCFR depends on directory or mandatory national law. Why? Because
the more the optional set of rules refers back to any system or to twenty-seven
national law systems, the more difficult it will be to grasp the legal relationship
and the more difficult it will therefore be to assess the risks of doing business.
3 References to national law
There are various places where the DCFR refers to national law in so many
words. While it does not do so in the context of contract law, it does in the
context of compensation law, unjust enrichment and property law. The con-
tractual rules of the DCFR frequently refer to law, without the adjective na-
tional. In the rules on the binding effect of a contract, for example: a contract is
binding on the parties; modification and termination is possible as provided by
law.6 The DCFR also provides that the terms of a contract may be derived
from the express or tacit agreement of the parties, and from the rules of law.7
The explanatory commentary shows that law can be construed to mean: na-
tional law.
5 Http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?aged=0&format=HTML&guiLangua
ge=en&language=EN&reference=IP/10/872.
6 Art II.–1:103.
7 Art II.–9:101(1).
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‘It is not only the present rules whichmay supply a term in the absence of express regulation in the
contract. Theremay be national or other lawswhich apply to the contract andwhich supply a term
or terms.’8
So the DCFR and national law go hand in hand. This need not cause problems
as long as the rules of the DCFR are identical to their national counterparts.
But of course they are not always so. The authors had to make choices where
European systems differ from each other. Suppose the wine merchant has
made a delivery to two students. Can he claim payment of the entire purchase
price from either, even though they have not agreed anything on the subject?
In other words, is their liability joint and several or – as the DCFR puts it –
solidary? Yes, says the DCFR, for pursuant to article III.–4.103(2) the default
rule is that the liability of two or more debtors is solidary. But the DCFR also
refers to national law, which in the case of the Netherlands and several other
countries provides that where two or more debtors are liable to perform the
same obligation, each is liable for an equal part. Or take the case that the wine
merchant fails to deliver and the students want him to perform the contract.
Under continental law the right to performance comes first as a matter of
course, but under English law on the contrary it does not. The DCFR opts
for the continental system. Consequently, it is not sufficient for simple con-
tracting parties to merely make the DCFR their choice of law. At subject-
matter level they must choose between the DCFR rules and deviating national
rules to which the DCFR refers expressly and as a parallel rule.
In addition to all this, the DCFR also uses the concept of mandatory rules, in
contract law even regularly.9 It puts party autonomy first – freedom of con-
tract – but subject to any applicable mandatory rules. This includes not only
mandatory law contained in theDCFR itself, but also national mandatory law.
Even when the wine merchant has chosen the DCFR as optional instrument,
he must still have regard to national rules, such as the Dutch rules of the
Higher Commodity Board for Arable Farming (Hoofdproductschap Akker-
bouw) for the preparation, packing and labelling of wine, and to similar rules
in the other twenty-six Member States. So with regard to the consequences of
violation of these rules, theDCFR refers to the rules themselves insofar as they
expressly provide for the consequences, and therefore to national law as well.
8 Volume I, 577. See also the rules on representative authority: representative authoritymay
be granted by the principal or by the law (art II.–6:103(1). The explanatory note refers to
national law in somanywords (Volume I, 417.) Art II.–6:106, moreover, refers to ‘any rule
of law’.
9 The DCFR has several more floodgates through which national laws pour in. It regularly
refers to statutory provisions, presumably including quality regulations and the like laid
down pursuant to statutory provisions. These are not typically civil-law provisions. In the
case of contracts for services, for example, the DCFR provides that the tools andmaterials
used for the services must be in conformity with the applicable statutory rules or other
binding legal rules (art IV.C.–2:105(1)(b)).
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It will be quite a job for the merchant if the rule in question – or the explan-
atory commentary – expressly leaves the consequences to be determined ac-
cording to substantive national civil law.
4 Interaction between public and private law
The European and national rules for the wine sector were established to pro-
tect private interests. In theory, the persons drafting and elaborating those
national rules – usually of a public-law nature – will take account of the nature
of the legal relationships between private parties, and therefore of the private-
law concepts on which wine growers and students have to depend, so as to
make clear what will be the consequences for these parties if the public-law
regulations are violated. This is a matter of proper drafting, in which the
authors must – to a certain extent – strive to achieve coherence and consis-
tency, for the sake of the accessibility and enforceability of the rules.
Violation of the Financial Supervision Act, for example, can be countered by a
public-lawmechanism of supervision and sanctions, while at the same time the
compensation of consumers for the loss they have suffered as a result of any
violation of the law has been deliberately left to be regulated by national
private law.10 In the Netherlands this has resulted in the firm ruling of the
Supreme Court that the precontractual duty of care of a financial institution
can extend beyond its obligations under the Financial Supervision Art.11 Con-
versely, the Netherlands Competition Authority for example is drawing up
guidelines for assessing termination rules in the energy sector using private-
law concepts.12
However that may be, public and private rules do interlock, sometimes inten-
tionally, sometimes unintentionally. It is therefore a perilous undertaking to
offer private parties a set of rules, by way of an optional instrument, which
covers only part of the private-law legal relationship and was created quite
apart from the national private-law and public-law context. In every single
case such a set of rules must be embedded in the applicable national private and
public law.13 The outcome of this process is not certain in advance. Conse-
quently, the wine merchant who chooses an optional instrument on the rec-
ommendation of the European Commission, does not knowwhat he is choos-
ing, either in the context of his own national law or in the context of the law of
10 Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 29 708, no 19, 393–394.
11 HR 5 June 2009, LJN BH2815; De Treek/Dexia.
12 See the decision of the Board of the Netherlands Competition Authority of 16 January
2008 (Guidelines Reasonable Termination Fees Licence Holders).
13 For private law see J. Cartwright, ‘Choice is good, Really?’ Secola conference, Leuven 15
January 2011.
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any of the other 26 Member States which applies to the legal relationship with
his customers pursuant to its conflict of laws rules.
So the DCFR is not the ideal optional instrument. What, then, can the Euro-
pean Commission do for wine merchants wishing to engage in cross-border
trade, and for students who so easily get their things from remote suppliers?
5 Social dialogue
It could seek inspiration in the Dutch polder, from the work of the Dutch
Social and Economic Council (SER) whose Self regulatory consultation Co-
ordination Group offers employers’ and consumers’ organisations an open
framework for consultation on well-balanced General Terms and Condi-
tions.14 A Consultation Group has been set up for each branch of business,
supported by the SER secretariat. Rights and obligations of entrepreneurs and
consumers are geared to the specific characteristics of the branch of business
while working out the statutory provisions on consumer terms and conditions
as specifically as possible. And a system of low-threshold, private dispute
resolution has been set up.
This could serve as a model for a European Self regulatory consultation sys-
tem, or Social Dialogue, providing a framework for drafting model contracts
that are tailored to individual sectors – with terms and conditions considered
acceptable throughout Europe, or virtually throughout Europe, with alterna-
tives for Member States having wider or narrower margins. The DCFR could
serve as auxiliary law, as did the ius commune studied by Revigny, as a source
of inspiration for making choices where the national systems leave parties a
choice. This might really serve the parties’ interests, because they can rely on
the assumption that the document can be used anywhere, while choices to be
made at the national level have been identified in advance. This is what the
European Commission could facilitate: commission an international group of
legal practitioners to draw up these documents and assess on a regular basis
which set of rules passes muster by this criterion, for each individual branch of
business, for each individual country.
The documents drawn up within this setting could serve as a basis for national
and international contracts, contracts which safeguard autonomy and will at
the same time come to contribute to convergence of our private-law systems,
starting with the law of contracts. The advantage would be that parties would
not each time have to ask for directions to find their way through the jungle of
rules applying in states and business sectors, while choosing a national private-
14 ww.stvda.nl/sitecore/content/internet/nl/raad/commissies/consumentenaangelegenhed
en/zelfreguleringsoverleg.aspx.
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law system will set up better conditions for coordination with and embodi-
ment in the national systems as long as the European Union continues to have
twenty-seven different systems of private law, criminal law and public law.
Last year, European Commissioner Reding talked about the realisation of a
European Law Institute – on which the same civil-law experts are working
that created the DCFR with such expedition – and she said that – for the
purposes of achieving a European legal culture – she also attached importance
to networks that support practitioners who help citizens and businesses on a
daily basis to understand the EU and its rules, and its common principles”.15
Social Dialogue would be a fine task for such a network.
15 Europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/154&format=HTM
L&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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